Economists have developed a body of literature that describes the processes by which industries and special interest groups attempt to influence the regulatory agencies that regulate them. These ideas form the basis of the aptly named Regulatory Capture Theory. According to this theory, regulatory agencies charged with acting in the public interest over time begin to act, instead, in favor of the special interests that dominate within the agency's domain.
Regulatory capture occurs when the goals of a regulatory agency become those of the industry or special interest group regulated by that agency.
Two conditions are necessary for capture to occur. First, the industry or special interest groups, which have economic or personal interests in the outcome of policies or regulations that are under consideration by the agency, organize and use their resources to encourage the adoption of policies and regulations they prefer. Second, members of the general public, each of whom have only a small individual stake in the policy or regulation, remain uninvolved or act as unorganized individuals.
By state constitution, charter, or statute, fishery management agencies in the United States are given, as a public trust, the responsibility of protecting, conserving, and managing fishery (aquatic) resources for the public good. This generally explicitly includes sport and nongame species (including imperiled species).
Are fishery management agencies vulnerable to capture?
Fishery managers and administrators increasingly describe their “constituents” or “clientele” as comprising recreational anglers and commercial interests (commercial fishers, for-profit organizers of competitive fishing events, etc.). This is not my interpretation- listen to fishery management biologists and administrators when they speak at public events.
Further, the funding for many fishery agencies is tied to license and permit fees required of these “constituencies” and the tenure of many administrators depends on their pleasing these “constituencies.”
Anglers make up only 16% of the US population. The general, non-angling public is neither organized nor active in expressing its interests and, as noted above, is no longer considered among the constituency of some fishery management agencies.
Given these observations the theory of regulatory capture predicts that fishery management agencies are subject to capture by anglers and angler interest groups. I am compiling examples for a later report.
Regulatory capture occurs when the goals of a regulatory agency become those of the industry or special interest group regulated by that agency.
Two conditions are necessary for capture to occur. First, the industry or special interest groups, which have economic or personal interests in the outcome of policies or regulations that are under consideration by the agency, organize and use their resources to encourage the adoption of policies and regulations they prefer. Second, members of the general public, each of whom have only a small individual stake in the policy or regulation, remain uninvolved or act as unorganized individuals.
By state constitution, charter, or statute, fishery management agencies in the United States are given, as a public trust, the responsibility of protecting, conserving, and managing fishery (aquatic) resources for the public good. This generally explicitly includes sport and nongame species (including imperiled species).
Are fishery management agencies vulnerable to capture?
Fishery managers and administrators increasingly describe their “constituents” or “clientele” as comprising recreational anglers and commercial interests (commercial fishers, for-profit organizers of competitive fishing events, etc.). This is not my interpretation- listen to fishery management biologists and administrators when they speak at public events.
Further, the funding for many fishery agencies is tied to license and permit fees required of these “constituencies” and the tenure of many administrators depends on their pleasing these “constituencies.”
Anglers make up only 16% of the US population. The general, non-angling public is neither organized nor active in expressing its interests and, as noted above, is no longer considered among the constituency of some fishery management agencies.
Given these observations the theory of regulatory capture predicts that fishery management agencies are subject to capture by anglers and angler interest groups. I am compiling examples for a later report.
Gene,
ReplyDeleteGreat beginning but there's a lot more to be said on this subject. State and federal agencies have some great folks who really want to do a good job, the trouble is an agency that has been 'captured' allows the regulatory 'clientele' to define what that job is. I'm looking forward to reading more of your thoughts on this subject.
RW
this is interesting, can you give me an example?
ReplyDeleteI agree that most fisheries professionals want to do a good job and ultimately want to maintain the health of the fisheries they are responsible for. I might take the idea of capture one step further. As you state, 16% of the general public fishes. However, of the angling public only a very small minority actually cares enough or knows enough to voice their opinion on fisheries managment topics. This small minority usually has very narrow interests (fly fishing catch and release trout anglers, largemouth bass tournament anglers etc). In my state we have a public input process in which people voluntarily show up to a hearing and vote on advisory questions related to hunting and fishing regulations. Approximately 8,000 people vote out of the 1.5 million licensed anglers. That's 0.5%. As a result, the number species/lake/stream reach specific regulations has exploded. These regulations go far beyond protecting most fisheries from collapse. Its to the point that the general public is having a hard time complying with the complex regulations that are in place.
ReplyDelete"this is interesting, can you give me an example?"
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure you're referring to my post, but if you are an example might be the commercial fishing interests in the Gulf of Mexico. These folks have huge influence on fishing policy in federal waters of the Gulf. Many of the NMFS biologists know that commercial red snapper catch, for example, is too high but they lack the power to go against the commercial fishery bias of the GOMFMC.
RW
Anonymous- I had intended to respond to your request for examples, yesterday, but had computer problems. I will post, separately, a couple of examples that might be of interest.
ReplyDelete